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Abstract
This article evaluates the current TTIP negotiations
regarding regulatory cooperation from the perspective of over
two decades of transatlantic effort. It examines six basic
approaches for transatlantic regulatory cooperation and
addresses the lessons to be learned from past efforts and their
failures. It evaluates what can be done that would be new and
could lead to regulatory learning and improvement in an
economically interdependent world characterized by risk and
uncertainty, while reducing the costs of duplicate, overlapping
regulatory standards impeding trade.
The proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) resurrects important issues of regulatory governance that date
back to the first Bush and Clinton Administrations in the 1990s. The
ongoing question is what can be done to remove regulatory barriers to
trade and investment, while still retaining democratic accountability to
citizens’ preferences and values regarding social protection in a world
of global production and distribution networks, complex
interdependence on account of economic globalization, and rapid
technological change. This article addresses six options for transatlantic
*
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regulatory governance, recalls the broader historic trajectory of
transatlantic negotiations regarding regulatory cooperation, and applies
the lessons from this experience to the current context. It speculates how
TTIP could deepen transatlantic regulatory cooperation to remove
unnecessary barriers to trade while enhancing social protection through
regulatory learning, despite significant political challenges on both
sides of the Atlantic.

I. OPTIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
GOVERNANCE
Before we evaluate the experience of transatlantic efforts at
regulatory cooperation and coherence, we should examine alternative
approaches. We can then evaluate the relative advantages and
disadvantages of these alternatives in light of the transatlantic
experience to date. The options vary in terms of how much they
facilitate trade, how respectful they are of divergent societal preferences,
how responsive and adaptive they are to change, and how difficult they
are to achieve politically.
A first option that should not be readily dismissed is simply to do
little or nothing in terms of adopting new regulatory harmonization,
mutual recognition, or procedural constraints on regulation. The result
would be regulatory competition, which, in practice, could lead to
convergence through markets, which has been alternately viewed in
terms of a race to the top or to the bottom. Most scholars contend that,
as regards product regulation (in contrast to regulation of capital and of
production processes), regulatory competition tends more frequently to
lead to a race to the top, as reflected in the development of high
regulatory standards within the European Union (EU) itself. David
Vogel and Anu Bradford respectively have written of these processes in
terms of a California effect 1 and a Brussels effect, 2 as have others
regarding specific regulatory areas, such as data privacy 3 and chemicals

1
DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 6 (2nd prtg., 1997).
2
Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012).
3
Gregory Shaffer, The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of EU Data Privacy Regulation
on US Business Practice, 5 EUR. L.J. 4 (1999).
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regulation. 4 In contrast, areas more likely to tend toward a race to the
bottom involve the regulation of capital, such as through the taxation of
capital, and the regulation of production processes, such as labor and
environmental regulation. 5 But it is product standards that are most
likely to be addressed in TTIP, such as regarding motor vehicles,
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, communication
technology, cosmetics, or engineered products, as proposed by the EU.6
The benefits of this approach are the learning of lessons from
regulatory diversity, the tailoring of standards to local preferences, and
the potential for higher standards through regulatory competition.
Regulators could also save considerable transaction costs, which arise
in all forms of trans-border regulatory negotiation and
institutionalization of standards, taking resources away from regulators’
domestic mandates. A potential cost, however, is duplicate standards
that create increased manufacturing and certification costs without
compensating benefits in terms of increased consumer protection. As
transatlantic trade and investment deepen, these costs become less
justifiable. Proponents of the TTIP chapter on regulatory cooperation
cite these costs to justify a new framework and sectoral initiatives for
regulatory cooperation.
A second option is harmonization of common standards. 7 The
advantage of harmonization is reduction of compliance costs for firms,
since they only have to meet one standard and thus do not need to create
multiple production facilities to comply with divergent regulatory
requirements. The cost of harmonization is that the processes can be
cumbersome, less responsive to local priorities and contexts, and less
subject to learning from experimentation. Harmonization of existing
regulations also is unattractive to industry and regulators where they
have sunk significant investment in compliance with existing standards.
The EU has been viewed as the party advocating greater harmonization
in light of its experience internally and externally, such as through the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the
4
Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the
Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897 (2009).
5
See Bradford, supra note 2; Shaffer, supra note 3.
6
See European Commission, TTIP and Regulation: An Overview, Feb. 10, 2015, at 6, 12–15,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153121.pdf.
7
A less ambitious variant of harmonized product standards is the harmonization of testing procedures
and data requirements.
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International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Yet, the EU in
fact has done little in its existing free trade agreements. 8
A third option is mutual recognition of standards pursuant to which
one country must accept a product from another regardless of the
detailed regulatory requirements that other country adopts, provided
that country’s regulatory requirements are essentially equivalent. The
requirement of essential equivalence could be softened to that of
meeting specified minimum safety principles for the product in question,
but this latter option would encounter stiffer resistance from nongovernmental organizations concerned that such an approach would
spur downward harmonization and thus a race toward the bottom. This
approach is linked to the famous Cassis de Dijon case in the EU, and it
is reflected in the EU’s so-called new approach that is now over thirty
years old. 9 Under this approach, EU legislation sets forth general
standards, EU standard-setting bodies (known as CEN, CENELEC, and
ETSI) create detailed voluntary ones that implement the general
standards, and any trader producing in compliance with these detailed
standards can sell its products throughout the EU. In such cases, the
manufacturer stamps a CE mark of conformity on the product following
either a self-certification or third party notification system specified in
the relevant EU directive. In its recent trade negotiations, the EU has
promoted this approach. For example, the EU has advocated the
acceptance of UNECE standards for motor vehicles (which the EU
applies internally) as being equivalent to the other contracting party’s
national standards, so that European cars produced according to
UNECE standards can be imported and sold in that country. 10
A fourth option, which is a less ambitious variant of a mutual
recognition approach, is mutual recognition of third party certifiers
(known as conformity assessment bodies, or CABs). Under this
approach, although there would be no mutual recognition of standards,
the mutual recognition of CABs would permit a CAB within the
jurisdiction of one party to assess and certify the conformity of a product
8
See Alasdair Young, Liberalizing trade, not exporting rules: the limits to regulatory co-ordination in
the EU’s ‘new generation’ preferential trade agreements, 22:9 Journal of European Public Policy 1253
(2015).
9
See Technical Harmonization and Standards: A New Approach, Bull. EC 1-1985 points 1.3.1–1.3.3.
10
See European Commission, The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in Practice 12 (2011), available
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/october/tradoc_148303.pdf; The EU-South Korea Free Trade
Agreement, 2011 O.J. (54/6) (May 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN.

2016]

REGULATORY GOVERNANCE UNDER TTIP

5

to the standards of the other party to the agreement. In this way, a
producer can have its product certified in its home country of production
and reduce compliance costs. The EU advocates this approach in TTIP,
as it has in earlier negotiations with the United States (US). 11 The key
for this approach to be successful is the building of trust that the
approved CABs are competent, honest, and themselves subject to
appropriate oversight. A related procedural variant is mutual
recognition of risk assessments of products by regulatory authorities in
either jurisdiction.
A fifth option does not entail either harmonization or mutual
recognition, but, rather, the creation of common oversight of the
regulatory process on either side (known as a horizontal approach),
which can lead to greater transparency and dialogue. Both sides have
promoted variants of this option in TTIP negotiations. 12 Namely, the US
and US stakeholders have pressed for the use of a body in the EU,
analogous to the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget, that would require
cost-benefit analysis for all European legislation and regulation. 13 US
business stakeholders would also like a mandatory notice and comment
period to be applied for all EU regulations, including for what the EU
calls delegated and implementing regulations. 14 The EU publicly
released a proposal for a chapter on horizontal regulatory cooperation,
which would create a Regulatory Cooperation Body that would monitor

11
Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29 (2002).
12
See e,g, Leak: EU Wants Political Officials to Prod Bilateral Regulatory Cooperation, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 25, 2016, http://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/leak-eu-wants-political-officials-prodbilateral-regulatory-cooperation (“The European Commission is planning to table a proposal that would
create a ministerial-level mechanism to ensure that U.S. and European Union regulators are engaging with
each other with the aim of avoiding measures that would impact transatlantic trade.”), .
13
Regulatory Coherence and Cooperation in the TTIP, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Feb. 25, 2016.
https://www.uschamber.com/speech/regulatory-coherence-and-cooperation-ttip (“[T]he U.S. and EU
should commit through TTIP to implement a robust impact assessment scheme. Such assessments should:
properly identify the problem that is to be solved, consider whether there is truly a need to regulate; assess
the costs and benefits of regulatory compliance; and make a clear case for why the ultimate regulatory
decision was made.”).
14
EU Meets U.S. Regulatory Demands Halfway with ‘Better Regulation Agenda,’ INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
July 9, 2015 (“EU sources this week said that U.S. trade officials have expressed an almost "religious"
conviction that the EU must apply notice-and-comment procedures to draft primary legislation as well as
secondary legislation. . . . The U.S. Chamber of Commerce . . . has pushed hard to impose U.S.-style “noticeand-comment” obligations on the EU’s legislative procedure.”).
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horizontal commitments regarding transparency and consultation for
future regulation. 15
A sixth option, also addressed in the concluding section, is to
combine horizontal and vertical processes through structured processes
of regulatory dialogue, the development of soft law and private codes,
and the incorporation of mutual recognition based on the concept of
mutual regulatory equivalence in the light of broader regulatory systems
and processes. 16 Under this approach, which can be viewed as a form of
new governance, 17 the EU and US, in particular regulatory fields, would
jointly create regulatory goals and measures to gauge achievement,
permit some variation in how regulatory agencies pursue the attainment
of these goals, and these agencies, as a condition for such autonomy,
would have to report to each other and central authorities regarding
regulatory outcomes, and participate in peer review processes aimed at
continual improvement and potential reassessment of goals. 18 This
approach would not entail a one-off acceptance of the other party’s
regulations as equivalent. Rather, it would involve ongoing mutual
scrutiny of outcomes and their effectiveness based on continuous and
deep information exchange by regulators committed to regulatory
improvement and attentive to risk, including potentially catastrophic
risks in many sectors, ranging from pharmaceuticals, medical devices,
food, agriculture, and finance. Under this approach, regulators exchange
information, can conduct joint trials and risk assessments, monitor
results, and adapt regulatory practices in light of the joint assessment of
15
EU Textual Proposal, TTIP—Initial Provisions for Chapter, Regulatory Cooperation (April 2015),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf. The EU proposal of March
21, 2016 does not use the term Regulatory Cooperation Body, but rather notes that the EU will submit
detailed proposals for “the institutional set-up to support regulatory cooperation under TTIP.” See European
Commission, TTIP-EU proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation (textual proposal made public on 21
March 2016), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf.
16
The OECD breaks down the full range of options into eleven approaches that include these
regulatory options. See OECD, International Regulatory Cooperation: Rules for a Global World (2012),
available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/RPC(2012)8/
REV1&docLanguage=En; Jonathan Wiener and & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International
Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, Law &
Contemporary Problems (forthcoming 2016).
17
Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of
Experimentalist Governance in the EU, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION;
TOWARD A NEW ARCHITECTURE, (Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds. 2010) (theorizing, describing,
and giving examples of new governance mechanisms in the EU); LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
AND THE US 2 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott, eds. 2006); Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer,
Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory, 67 SOUTHERN METHODIST U. L. REV. (2014).
18
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative
State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011).
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outcomes. The development, implementation, and review of Hazard
Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) systems to identify and
protect against food pathogens is one example among others of a
systemic approach to reduce and respond to risks. 19
Transparency is central to this model through processes of
information sharing, peer review, questioning, and response. The posing
of questions is important in two ways: One learns about others from
their response to the question asked; and one learns about oneself in
gathering the information to formulate a response, which in turn can
lead to adaptive learning. This approach is reflected in different aspects
of EU governance, including the EU’s comitology processes that bring
together national regulators from all EU member states, 20 and its open
method of coordination involving the setting of framework goals,
measures aimed to gauge their achievement, and a structured sharing of
best practices among regulators and affected stakeholders, coordinated
by the European Commission, that can lead to policy learning, mutual
understanding, cooperation, and (possibly) convergence. 21
II. THE TRAJECTORY OF TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION SINCE 1990
The negotiators and advocates of TTIP are attempting once more to
address prospects for transatlantic regulatory coherence and
cooperation in efforts that are at least a quarter-century old. 22 We should
review past initiatives and their outcomes to learn from them.
The reason to remove regulatory barriers to trade, commonly called
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in trade policy, is based on the theory of
comparative advantage, which provides that the most efficient social
welfare outcome is one of free trade. As tariffs across the Atlantic
receded in importance, officials, businesses, and scholars gave greater
19
See Charles Sabel and William Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Instituitonalization as a Response
to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 Michigan L. Rev. 1, 18, 20 (2012).
20
See generally Christian Joerges & Jurgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to
Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. L. J. 2733 (1997).
21
Sabel and Zeitlin, supra note 18.
22
See generally Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and
Theoretical Perspective in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 3–42 (Mark
Pollack & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001) [hereinafter Pollack & Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance]; MARK
POLLACK & GREGORY SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009) [hereinafter POLLACK & SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS];
Shaffer, supra note 11, at 36–37; Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition
Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 274 (2005).
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attention to unnecessary regulatory barriers to trade, such as in the form
of duplicative regulations that provide no material improvement to
social protection. An example of a clearly protectionist NTB was
France’s requirement in the 1970s that all VCRs from Japan be
imported through Poitiers, a small city hundreds of miles from a
shipping port. 23 Yet most NTBs do not reflect such protectionist
intentions, but rather are facially neutral and tailored toward health,
safety, and environmental protection but nonetheless are disparate and
thus costly. 24 For example, Hoekman notes how regulatory differences
for light trucks in the US and EU require the development of one
hundred new parts, costing an additional $42 million in design costs.25
NTBs that offer no compensating social benefits constitute deadweight
losses and are thus worse than tariffs because the government receives
no revenue from them. They also are more pernicious than tariffs
because it is costlier to negotiate their reduction on a case-by-case basis
(in contrast to across-the-board tariff cuts) and because they impose
requirements that traders cannot overcome by simply becoming more
efficient. Concerns over such NTBs have grown with the development
of global supply chains and increased cross-border investment.
Because of the low levels of tariffs between the US and EU today, 26
NTBs are the greatest challenge for freeing transatlantic trade.
Estimates of NTBs range widely, and should be subject to a skeptical
eye, especially as some of them are simply based on firm surveys. In a
2013 EU-commissioned study, economist Joe Francois estimated that
eliminating NTB’s would add around 0.5 percent to transatlantic GDP,
23
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 155 (1997) (In noting the Poitiers Customs House case: “Examples of measures that
appear to be designed to restrict the amount of imports are sometimes amusing. For example . . . an
importing nation requires VCRs to be imported only through one customs office, which is located in an
interior city and has a limited amount of staff to process the goods.”).
24
See e.g. Richard Parker, Four Challenges for TTIP Regulatory Cooperation, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
1 (2016) (discussing the example of auto regulations requiring the use of different auto parts for cars in the
U.S. and Europe).
25
Bernard Hoekman, Fostering Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and Gradual
Multilateralization, 18 Journal of International Economic Law, 609, 611 (2015).
26
See Koen G. Berden, Joseph Francois, Mr Martin Thelle, and Ms Saara Tamminen. “Non-Tariff
Measures in EU-US Trade and investment–An Economic Analysis.” Report Number OJ 2007/S 180 219493
(2009) (“in general, transatlantic tariff barriers are actually quite low, imposing costs on trade that average
between 3-4 percent of the €707 billion ($919 billion) in annual EU-US trade in goods and services”);
Countries & Regions: United States. European Commission: Trade (October 27, 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/ (“Tariff rate, applied, simple
mean, manufactured products (%) in United States was 2.70 as of 2013. Its highest value over the past 24
years was 5.79 in 1991, while its lowest value was 2.70 in 2013”)..
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while reducing tariffs would have almost negligible effects on the US
and EU economies. 27 Francois thus concluded that focusing on
eliminating NTBs is the best approach.
What has been missing in much of the discussion and debate about
regulatory coherence and cooperation is that engaging in them also can
improve regulation through processes of regulatory learning, such that
national regulation can become both more efficient and more effective.
To facilitate such learning processes, institutional mechanisms must be
built that directly engage regulators. Creating them, however, is costlier
difficult to achieve than simply negotiating reciprocal tariff reductions.
Globally, NTBs became a part of trade negotiation mandates in the
1970s during the Tokyo Round that gave rise to the GATT Standards
Code, a predecessor to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT agreement) in the WTO created in 1995. 28 In parallel, US and EU
officials negotiate common, harmonized standards in global fora, such
as the International Standards Organization and the three sanitary and
phytosanitary organizations of Codex Alimentarius, OIE (World
Organization for Animal Health), and International Plant Protection
Commission (IPPC), referenced in the WTO Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement). These standards are
voluntary, and agreement has been highly variable across domains. In
the WTO’s twenty-one years, nonetheless, there have been no TBT
disputes and only two SPS disputes litigated between the US and EU
before a panel, the EC-Biotech case regarding EU regulations on
genetically modified foods, 29 and the EC-Meat Hormones case
regarding the EU ban on the use of growth hormones in the production
of pork and beef. 30
27
See Joseph Francois, Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic
Assessment,
European
Union
Report
(March
2013),
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf;); European Commission, Countries
& Regions: United States, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/
(last visited Mar. 28, 2016). Cf. ECORYS 2009 Study, Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and
Investment—An
Economic
Analysis,
at
45,
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc_145613.pdf. Estimates are provided with
regards to expected changes in GDP, sector output, aggregate and bilateral trade flows, wages, and labor
displacement, among other issues. The analysis uses the GTAP8 database (projected to 2027), in
conjunction with NTB estimates reported in the ECORYS 2009 Study.
28
See Kennedy, Kevin C. “GATT-WTO System at Fifty, The.” Wis. Int’l LJ 16 (1997): 421 – 526, at
460.
29
See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (adopted Nov. 21, 2006).
30
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products,
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Given the challenges of advancing regulatory coherence and
cooperation through global organizations, US and EU officials turned
to new transatlantic fora in the 1990s. In the 1990 Transatlantic
Declaration, the two sides agreed to address regulatory barriers, and this
initiative led to bi-annual consultations between US and EU officials.
The US was particularly concerned that the EU’s internal market
program of the early 1990s would lead to a “Fortress Europe” of new
standards that prejudice US products. 31
In the mid-1990s during the Clinton Administration, businesses, and
in particular, US businesses, took the lead toward establishing a
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). 32 Business drove the two
sides to agree to establish a Transatlantic Advisory Committee on
Standards, Certification, and Regulatory Policy that would lead to
harmonization and mutual recognition of each other’s standards. The
goal was for products to be “approved once, and accepted everywhere
in the new Transatlantic Marketplace.” 33
In December 1995, the EU and US under the Clinton Administration
established the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), which was to further
address regulatory coordination and coherence. In 1997, they agreed to
a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for six sectors, which was
followed by a seventh sector. In 1998, the EU and US launched the
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) that was to further advance
regulatory cooperation. 34 The TEP Action Plan called for the removal
of technical barriers to trade and enhanced dialogue between EU and
US regulators.
Despite considerable US-European conflict and tensions during the
Bush Administration regarding foreign policy, transatlantic efforts at
regulatory cooperation continued. 35 In May 2002, the US and EU
endorsed new Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and
Transparency, again encouraging agency-to-agency cooperation. In
WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998).
31
Shaffer, supra note 11, at 37.
32
Maria Green Cowles, The Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Transforming the New Transatlantic
Agenda, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 22, at 213–14.
33
DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS?: REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 11 (1997).
34
Mark Pollack, The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections on an Experiment in International
Governance, 43 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 899, 907 (2005).
35
See Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer, The Future of Transatlantic Economic Relations: Continuity
Amid Discord?, J. EUR. CONSORTIUM POL. RESEARCH 62, 63–64 (2006) (noting, for example, foreign
policy conflicts over the Iraq war, the creation of an International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol
on climate change.
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2005, they created a EU-US High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum
to address regulatory issues and exchange best practices across sectors
of common interest. This forum was co-chaired by the US
Administrator of OIRA and the EU Director-General of the Directorate
General for Enterprise and Industry.
The transatlantic institution overseeing regulatory cooperation
again changed names in 2007 under the Bush Administration when the
two sides established the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC),
another “high-level” political body that this time was to advance
regulatory cooperation through a Framework for Advancing
Transatlantic Economic Integration (FATEI). That effort collapsed,
however, over a dispute regarding EU restrictions on the import of
chlorine-rinsed chicken. 36
During the second term of the Obama Administration, the two sides
intensified efforts at regulatory cooperation under the TEC, in part in
light of the ongoing challenges of the financial crisis, and in part
because it was an area where the Obama Administration potentially
could work with a Republican-dominated Congress. In 2011, the USEuropean Commission High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum
(HLRCF), originally formed by the Bush Administration, issued a joint
statement of agreed regulatory principles to be applied horizontally
across all regulation, entitled Common Understanding on Regulatory
Principles and Best Practices. The Common Understanding affirmed
both sides’ commitment to the following core principles: “evidencebased policy-making;” “transparency and openness;” “analysis of
relevant alternatives;” “monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness;”
and the “aim for simplicity.” 37 In 2012, President Obama issued
Executive Order (EO) 13,609, which required all US agencies to
consider regulatory cooperation as part of their functions. 38 Following
President Obama’s State of the Union address in February 2013 at the

36
Tyson Barker, For Transatlantic Trade, This Time Is Different: Why the Latest U.S.-EU Trade Talks
Are Likely to Succeed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Feb. 26, 2013; see also WTO, European Communities—Certain
Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United States—Request for
Consultations by the United States (WT/DS389/1, January 20, 2009).
37
US-European Commission High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, Common Understanding on
Regulatory
Principles
and
Best
Practices
(June
2011),
at
1,
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/july/tradoc_148030.pdf.
38
See Exec. Order No. 13609, 3 C.F.R. § 26413 (2012), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/eo_13609/eo13609_05012012.pdf.).
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start of his second Presidential term, the two sides launched negotiations
of TTIP. 39
III. ANY LESSONS LEARNED?
These high-level political initiatives over a quarter of a century
illustrate the considerable efforts to lay groundwork for a TTIP. And
yet, the actual outcomes of these initiatives seem meager, raising the
question of what lessons can be learned from them? This section
addresses those lessons and then turns to the EU’s proposals in May
2015 and March 2016 for a regulatory cooperation chapter in TTIP.

A. The Challenge of Whose Terms?
Not surprisingly, each side would like to convince the other to move
toward its particular regulatory approach to enhance “coherence.” To
generalize, the US would like the EU to adopt its system of cost-benefit
analysis and notice and comment being applied to all regulations. In the
US, if such procedures are not followed, regulators can be sued in court,
and the regulation subject to injunction. The EU, in contrast, would
prefer the US to apply its approach of adopting common harmonized
standards, such as international standards, and where common standards
are not adopted, to provide for mutual recognition of each other’s
standards as equivalent or, failing that, mutual recognition of CABs, the
conformity assessment bodies that certify compliance with standards.
Neither side, however, is likely to adopt the other’s regulatory
approach wholesale. Unlike in the US, most regulations in the EU are
passed by the EU legislature (consisting of the European Parliament and
the Council of Ministers), and not by EU regulators. The EU process
nonetheless is quasi-administrative in that it begins with draft legislative
acts developed by the European Commission that the Commission
submits to the European Parliament and Council for approval, where
modification may occur pursuant to formalized rules. 40 There is thus
39
Len Bracken & Dan Pruzin, U.S.-EU Deal Aspires to Broader Scope Than Traditional Free Trade
Agreements, 30 INT’L TRADE REP. 256, 256 (2013).
40
Richard W. Parker & Alberto Alemanno, A Comparative Overview of the EU and US Legislative
and Regulatory Systems: Implications for Domestic Governance & the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. (forthcoming, 2016).
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time for the Commission to engage in consultations and impact
assessments. Indeed, the Commission already engages in impact
assessments for EU legislation, and, in May 2015, the Commission
proposed a Better Regulation Agenda that will subject EU lawmaking
and regulation to enhanced transparency and consultation obligations, 41
an internal development that could facilitate agreement on a regulatory
cooperation chapter in TTIP.
For some, it may seem that the EU approach of harmonization on
essential requirements combined with mutual recognition when
regulatory standards are roughly equivalent is preferable. After all, the
EU has considerable experience in creating a single market with high
levels of regulatory protection involving products produced in twentyeight Member States involving twenty-eight different national
legislatures and sets of regulators. Yet, on reflection, it is not surprising
that civil society organizations and regulators on both sides are wary of
adopting a strong presumption in favor of harmonized standards, mutual
recognition of each other’s standards, and mutual recognition of each
other’s CABs.
First, as regards the mutual recognition of standards, it is not easy
for authorities on either side to do so where there is evidence that
divergent standards affect safety differently. This challenge became
clear in the attempt to harmonize and apply mutual recognition to motor
vehicle standards. 42 For a producer, different standards may be simply
redundant. But for a regulator, such as the FDA regarding drugs and
medical devices, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Association
(NHTSA) regarding motor vehicle safety, it is wary of accepting
products produced under different standards that could raise risks to
domestic consumers.
Second, recognition of certifiers should in principle be easier but
they too face severe challenges. First, the EU consists of twenty-eight
countries with twenty-four official languages. For US regulatory
authorities to accept certifications from European CABs, they must
41
See European Commission, Press Release: Better Regulation Agenda: Enhancing Transparency and
Scrutiny for Better EU Law-Making, May 19, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-154988_en.htm.
42
See U.S., E.U. Vehicles do not Achieve Equivalent Levels of Safety, Study Finds, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Aug. 13, 2015, http://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/us-eu-vehicles-do-not-achieve-equivalent-levelssafety-study-finds; Cf. Vann H. Wilber & Paul T. Eichbrecht, Transatlantic Trade, the Automotive Sector,
in SYSTEMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 165,
168 (Simon Evenett & Robert Stern eds., 2011).
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learn to trust CABs operating in these twenty-eight countries working
in these different languages, while EU authorities only need to trust
CABs operating in just one additional country that works in an EU
official language — English. It is completely asymmetrical to expect
the US simply to agree to be treated as one more EU member state part
of an EU mutual recognition system.
Third, as regards international standards, it is relatively easier for
the EU to export its standards to international standard-setting
organizations because collectively EU member standard-setting bodies
have twenty-eight votes compared to the US body’s one vote. Moreover,
the EU has expanded its standards to other neighboring countries
through its network of trade agreements, including with other European
countries that are not members of the EU (under the European
Economic Area, UNECE, and bilateral agreements), Mediterranean
countries (under the Barcelona Process), and former French, British,
and other European colonies who are members of the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (the ACP). In addition, EU
standard-setting bodies have signed agreements with international
standard-setting bodies, which have similar organizational structures, so
that they already work in close conjunction with each other. 43 US
standard-setting bodies, in contrast, are less well-positioned.
B. Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Coordination
Second, it is difficult if not impossible to provide for real regulatory
coherence and cooperation in a top-down way by trade officials that do
not engage regulators. The success of the EU single market system is
based on building trust among regulators through the creation of new
institutions through which regulatory officials engage with each other
on a sustained basis. 44 The 1997 MRA, in contrast, failed when
regulatory officials felt that trade officials were pressing them to
compromise their regulatory mandates. 45 TTIP too is very much a trade
negotiation that has deep regulatory implications, and the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) drives these negotiations
on the US side. The result is a focus on reducing trade barriers and thus
43
KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM, FROM COMPETITION TO CONVERGENCE: TTIP AND THE EVOLUTION OF
GLOBAL STANDARDS 20–23 (2015).
44
See Joerges & Neyer, supra note 20, at 298.
45
Shaffer, supra note 11, at 40.
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on deregulation, and much less on learning and improvement from a
regulatory perspective. Formally, negotiators state that TTIP does not
aim at deregulation, but rather at reducing duplicate regulation and
unnecessary costs. 46 Yet many business stakeholders are interested in
less regulation, say, of chemicals under the EU’s REACH legislation,
or the precautionary principle for food safety, or privacy standards for
data transfers, which raises regulators’ resistance to change when they
have mandates committing them to provide social protection in these
areas. 47
In addition, even where mutual recognition of certifiers is negotiated,
the private market for CABs is based on trust involving long-term
commercial relationships. National commercial markets tend to prefer
national CABs so that even where a foreign CAB is approved, it is far
from clear that the market will accept that CAB’s mark. Where it is not,
such mutual recognition may change the law-in-the-books, but not
increase market access. 48 A deeper process of trust-building through the
experience of market actors is required.
C. Regulatory Culture
Third, regulators will more likely fruitfully engage with each other
if they operate within similar regulatory cultures. For example, as I have
noted elsewhere, both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have dual missions focused
on assuring both consumer protection and open competition.
Accordingly, it was easier for them to cooperate with trade authorities
to develop and apply the 1997 EU-US MRA regarding
telecommunications, and the 2000 Safe Harbor Principles on data
privacy protection. 49 In contrast, where regulatory agencies’ core
mandates are to protect consumer safety (and not also to facilitate
commerce) and where they are pressed to change their regulatory
systems to accommodate foreign goods, they are less likely to build
confidence and more likely to feel they are being pressed to compromise
46
James Kanter, Regulations May Be Snag in U.S.-E.U. Trade Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/business/international/regulations-seen-as-snag-in-us-europe-tradetalks.html?_r=0.
47
REACH is the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals,
which entered into force in the EU on June 1, 2007. See Scott, supra note 4, at 897–98. On EU data privacy,
see generally Shaffer, supra note 3; and on the precautionary principle as applied to genetically modified
foods, see generally POLLACK & SHAFFER, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS, supra note 22.
48
See Shaffer, supra note 11, at 35.
49
See Shaffer, supra note 11, at 71.
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their standards. For example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were
asked to experiment with delegating functions to private testing bodies
under the 1997 MRA. They balked, and did not implement the annexes
calling for mutual recognition initiatives in their domains.
D. The Commission’s May 2015 and March 2016 Proposals for a
TTIP Regulatory Cooperation Chapter
In May 2015 and March 2016, the EU made public its proposals for
a Regulatory Cooperation chapter that provides that all regulatory acts
at the US federal and EU levels, including US federal statutes and
regulations and EU regulations, directives, delegated and implementing
acts, would be subject to a series of horizontal requirements. 50 The
proposals aim to enhance transparency and stakeholder input by
requiring that each side “shall offer a reasonable opportunity for any
interested natural or legal person, on a non-discriminatory basis, to
provide input through a public consultation process, and shall take into
account the contributions received.” 51 The proposals provide that each
party shall aim to carry out a regulatory “impact assessment,” in
accordance with its own procedures, pursuant to which it will “take
account of the regulatory approaches of the other Party” and the “impact
on international trade or investment.” 52 The proposals further create a
framework for “regulatory exchanges” regarding new laws and
regulations that would be the subject of a “joint examination” of “means
to promote regulatory compatibility,” including through mutual
recognition of equivalence, harmonization, and regulatory
simplification. 53 To facilitate such exchanges, each side is to publish a
list of planned regulatory acts at least once a year. 54 A new transatlantic
Regulatory Cooperation Body, or other “institutional set-up,” is to
50
Cf. EU Textual Proposal, TTIP- Initial Provisions for Chapter []—Regulatory Cooperation,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf (made public in May 2015)
[EU May 2015 proposal]; European Commission, TTIP-EU proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation
(textual
proposal
made
public
on
21
March
2016),
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154377.pdf; and TTIP-EU proposal for Chapter:
Good
Regulatory
Practices,
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_154380.pdf (also made public on 21 March 2016)
[EU March 2016 proposal].
51
May 2015 proposal. at art. 6 (a footnote clarifies that regulators must “examine comments on their
merits,” but they do not need to take them “on board.”).
52
Cf March 2016 proposal, Good Regulatory Practices at art 8.4(c); May 2015 proposal, at art. 7.
53
Cf March 2016 proposal, Regulatory Cooperation, at art. 5; May 2015 proposal. at arts. 8–12.
54
Cf March 2016 proposal, Good Regulatory Practices at art 5.1; May 2015 proposal, art. 5.

2016]

REGULATORY GOVERNANCE UNDER TTIP

17

monitor implementation of the provisions and advance new
initiatives. 55
IV. REASONS FOR CONCERN AND CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
EU-US success with transatlantic regulatory cooperation to date
has been modest. The growing polarization of politics within the US
and the EU could make transatlantic regulatory cooperation even more
difficult, such that implementing regulatory cooperation in a manner
accepted as legitimate on both sides of the Atlantic faces considerable
challenges. Nonetheless, there are reasons both for concern and for
greater optimism than in the past, depending on the course that the US
and EU follow.
First, regarding reasons for optimism, there has been increased
interaction among regulatory officials over time so that regulatory
authorities have become more educated about each other’s systems.56
This regulatory interaction, in principle, can lead both to greater trade
facilitation and consumer protection. FDA and member state regulatory
officials, for example, have met to study evaluations of new products.
They have created joint alert and safeguard systems to notify each other
of risks and coordinate their responses. Through such exchanges,
regulatory officials can learn to build on each other’s experiences, avoid
duplicative efforts, and use their limited resources more efficiently.57
The EU has, in the process, strengthened its regulations so that
inspections of good manufacturing practices for pharmaceuticals are
much more similar on both sides of the Atlantic. 58
Second, and relatedly, there has been some convergence of US
and EU regulatory approaches. On the EU side, under the 2003 Interinstitutional arrangement on better law-making, the EU agreed to
experiment with more flexible legal forms, namely procedures for coregulation with and self-regulation by economic actors. Under coregulation procedures, the EU legislature passes a basic act that sets
forth objectives and (in some cases) essential requirements, and then
55

Cf March 2016 proposal, Regulatory Cooperation, Annex; May 2015 proposal. at arts. 13–16.
For example, in 2012, the US and EU led efforts to establish the International Medical Device
Regulators Forum, the successor to the Global Harmonization Task Force. See Wiener & Alemanno, supra
note 16.
57
See Shaffer, supra note 11, at 69.
58
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delegates to economic actors the authority to address the details in a
voluntary agreement that they provide to the Commission. The
Commission then verifies and monitors compliance with the agreement.
Under self-regulation processes, economic actors create European
codes of practice and sectoral agreements to regulate themselves and
obviate the need for public intervention. 59 These legal forms, which are
less costly and intrusive and can be more adaptable to learning from
field experience, are easier to coordinate across the Atlantic. Thus, in
sectors where both the US and EU adopt this approach, regulatory
cooperation to reduce barriers to trade should be easier. That being said,
where co-regulation and self-regulation could increase risks to
consumer safety, they raise significant concern, as addressed below.
Under its 2005 Better Regulation for Growth, its 2005
Simplification Strategy, its 2009 Impact Assessment Guidelines, its
2010 Smart Regulation, and its 2012 Regulatory Fitness program and
Action Program to reduce administrative burdens, the EU has been
moving to reduce regulatory barriers generally, which also could
facilitate reaching sectoral regulatory agreements with US regulatory
counterparts. 60 The EU’s impact assessment program, administered by
a Regulatory Scrutiny Board, was influenced by US precedents. 61
Under these initiatives, the EU has repealed and revised acts and merged
texts to make them more coherent. It also has made greater use of coregulation. The EU claims that, as a result, it has reduced the
administrative burden of EU law by 30.5% from 2007-2012. 62 These
developments facilitate the possibility of agreeing on horizontal
disciplines in TTIP, such as on enhanced transparency and the use of
regulatory impact assessments that apply some sort of cost-benefit
analysis, although likely with more flexibility as to how to apply cost59
See Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, OJ C321/01 (2003) 1; Adrienne Héritier,
New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making without Legislating, in COMMON GOODS:
REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 185, 185–86 (Adrienne Héritier ed., 2002).
60
See DAMIEN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 405–06 (3rd ed.,
2014).
61
On July 1, 2015 the EU Regulatory Scrutiny Board replaced an earlier EU Impact Assessment Board
(IAB). See European Commission, Regulatory Scrutiny Board, at http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/impact/iab/iab_en.htm. For further background, see Jonathan Wiener, Better Regulation in
Europe, 59 CURRENT LEG. PROBS. 447, 448–53 (2006); Jonathan Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, Comparing
Regulatory Oversight Bodies across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the
U.S. and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309, 315 (Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010).
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Commission Staff Working Document, Action Program for Reducing Administrative Burdens in
the EU Final Report, at 7, SWD 422 final (Dec. 12, 2012).
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benefit analysis than the US advocates. 63 There is also a possibility that
new institutional structures for regulatory exchange involving
centralized regulatory oversight could occur, likely engaging OIRA in
the US and the Commission’s Secretariat-General (Sec. Gen.) in the EU.
Together they could oversee and promote initiatives that engage
regulatory officials in particular sectors through a new transatlantic
body such as the Regulatory Cooperation Body proposed by the EU. 64
Third, there is greater political willingness now than in the past
in the US to pursue a transatlantic deal, compared to when the former
EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan earlier called for the
negotiation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA). 65
Processes have been blocked in the WTO and the US has accordingly
invested in the two mega-regional trade negotiations of TTIP and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In part, the US is responding to the
loss of relative US-EU dominance in the WTO in light of the rise of
China and other emerging economies. In addition, the 2008 financial
crisis led to a loss of confidence, particularly in Europe, coupled with
some European concern regarding a US “pivot” toward Asia, 66 reflected
in the signature of the TPP on February 4, 2016. Within the US, OIRA
also became more interested than in the past in acting as an interlocutor
with EU officials, a body that has a greater regulatory profile than does
the USTR.
And yet, there are also reasons for concern. First, if transatlantic
regulatory cooperation is based increasingly on regulatory
simplification through industry self-regulation, the question becomes in
what areas. Industry self-regulation works where there are clear
economic gains from harmonization and no externalities, such as for
certain types of technical standards. But industry self-regulation also
can put public health and the environment at risk in many areas.
Second, the Commission’s proposals for regulatory cooperation are
public and thus subject to stakeholder scrutiny and critique. In contrast,
the US is calling for greater regulatory transparency in Europe while
hypocritically refusing to publicly release its proposals for regulatory
63
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cooperation in TTIP. Such a lack of transparency raises serious concern
that the aim of a TTIP regulatory cooperation chapter is to advance
industry interests, where industry has informal access to trade officials’
negotiating texts, and not broader consumer and environmental
regulatory protection. The Commission’s May 2015 and March 2016
proposals itself raise concerns that regulation could be subject to new,
time-consuming procedural requirements, such as a trade impact
assessment, that could lead to reduced regulatory responsiveness to
risks to the environment, safety, and health. 67 Adding additional
procedural layers in a form that could ossify regulatory processes, such
as through requiring a trade impact assessment, rightly raise resistance.
But at lease the Commission proposals are public and thus subject to
comment and amendment.
Third, from a regulatory perspective, regulatory cooperation and
coherence cannot be left to trade officials. It must engage regulators
who have common missions in particular domains in a bottom-up way.
Such regulatory cooperation is not cost-free, but takes time and
resources, which can interfere with regulators’ accomplishing their
regulatory mandates. Such resources must be raised, perhaps from
business stakeholders themselves, in order to ensure that initiatives
toward greater regulatory coherence not only liberalize trade but also
improve regulation. 68
Different technologies for regulatory cooperation of course should
be tailored to particular regulatory contexts. That being said, TTIP
negotiators should focus, in particular, on creating a framework for
regulators to engage in regulatory cooperation to assess and potentially
recognize “regulatory equivalence” based on outcomes, starting with
pilot projects with dedicated funds. 69 Such an approach is politically
more feasible, is less likely to raise concerns that TTIP has a
deregulatory agenda that can undermine regulatory protection, and is
more apt for a world of global supply chains where multiple companies
interact in different aspects of production that collectively can pose
significant, and even catastrophic, risks. 70 Under this approach, the two
67
The Commission’s March proposal is in the document TTIP- EU proposal for Chapter: Good
Regulatory Practices, supra note…
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sides would aspire to maximize responsiveness to uncertainty and rapid
technological change in an interdependent world. The aim would be to
develop a process of exchange where regulators could accept the
regulatory decisions of the other party if they are made through a system
whose outputs are found to be “equivalent” in a particular regulatory
domain based on ongoing monitoring and information exchange. The
focus would be on creating processes on both sides of the Atlantic to
identify risks, and monitor and reduce them, so that systems and
processes in a regulatory area can “co-evolve” by learning from each
other’s experiences. 71 Over time, these systems could converge by
adapting to what they learn from each other, while remaining open to
different approaches so long as goals and outcomes are constantly
monitored.
To do so, new institutional mechanisms are needed to facilitate
information exchange, monitoring, and the building of trust. As
proposed by the EU, a new transatlantic body, such as a Regulatory
Cooperation Body, should be formed to support new initiatives and
oversee overall efforts. Other institutions could complement it in
particular regulatory domains. Hoekman, for example, recommends the
creation of “knowledge platforms” that bring together “academics,
regulators, government agencies, and NGOs,” building from existing
examples within countries. 72 He similarly notes the potential role for
supply chain councils that would identify regulatory policies that
generate unnecessary costs in light of regulatory objectives. 73
Regulators in particular domains in the US and EU would agree on
regulatory goals and objectives in the pilot area in light of existing and
new legislation, together with criteria for assessing whether these
objectives have been met in terms of outcomes. Any recognition of
regulatory equivalence would be conditional and subject to ongoing
reporting and monitoring procedures aimed at building and retaining
trust and providing for potential modifications based on regulatory
learning. These programs could engage regulatory officials and
business and civil society stakeholders in co-regulation in particular
sectors in light of systemic health, environmental, and consumer safety
71
Bernard Hoekman and Charles Sabel, The co-evolution of trade and regulation (2015) (NYU
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concerns. Such programs have antecedents in the co-regulation,
comitology and open method of coordination processes in the EU and
negotiated rulemaking and public-private co-regulation in the US. 74 At
times, they could lead to the institutionalization of broader sectoral
frameworks, giving rise to more coherent and cooperative transatlantic
regulatory systems that reduce barriers to trade while enhancing
regulatory responsiveness in an increased number of domains.
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